The Idea of Constitutional Justification
Freiburger Vorträge zur Staatswissenschaft und Rechtsphilosophie
Anfahrt
- Datum: 10.02.2027
- Uhrzeit: 18:00 - 20:00
- Vortragender: Prof. Dr. Jacob Weinrib (Queen’s University Faculty of Law)
- Jacob Weinrib is an associate professor at the Queen’s University Faculty of Law. He teaches and researches constitutional law, administrative law, and legal theory.
Weinrib is the author of two books: Dimensions of Dignity: The Theory and Practice of Modern Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press, 2016) and The Impasse of Constitutional Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2025). His articles have appeared in Modern Law Review, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Law & Philosophy, Jurisprudence, Ratio Juris, Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, Supreme Court Law Review, and the University of Toronto Law Journal.
Weinrib has received multiple awards for his research and teaching, including the Canadian Association of Law Teachers Academic Excellence Award, the Les Green Prize for Research Excellence, the Australian Society of Legal Philosophy Essay Prize, and the Stanley M. Corbett Award for Excellence in Teaching (2019 and 2023).
Prior to joining Queen’s Faculty of Law, Weinrib graduated from the Combined JD/PhD Program in Law and Philosophy at the University of Toronto, where he studied as a Vanier Scholar and received the David Savan Dissertation Prize. He held a SSHRC Postdoctoral Fellowship at the New York University School of Law as a Global Hauser Research Fellow in the Center for Constitutional Transitions (2013–2014) and as a Dworkin-Balzan Fellow in the Center for Law and Philosophy (2014–2015). - Ort: Freiburg, Fürstenbergstr. 19
- Raum: Seminarraum (F 113) | Gäste sind herzlich eingeladen; Anmeldung erbeten
- Gastgeber: MPI-CSL in Kooperation mit dem Institut für Staatswissenschaft & Rechtsphilosophie der Universität Freiburg
- Kontakt: c.hillemanns@csl.mpg.de
In his 1977 essay “Taking Rights Seriously,” Ronald Dworkin surveyed the constitutional landscape and observed two opposing models of constitutional rights. The first defines rights broadly and then balances them against the demands of society at large. The second regards balancing with suspicion and seeks to carefully delineate the definition of a particular right. In the last fifty years, these models have become increasingly systematic and antagonistic. With respect to their systematicity, each model elaborates the architecture of constitutional rights and a corresponding method of interpretation and adjudication. With respect to their antagonism, each model seeks to establish its superiority by demonstrating that the other is incapable of taking rights seriously. In the first model, rights can be balanced away. In the second model, rights can be defined away.
This talk (1) formulates a succinct and systematic statement of the structure of each model; (2) explains why constitutional thought has splintered into these opposing models; (3) shows that each model is equally vulnerable to the charge of failing to take rights seriously; and (4) traces the vulnerabilities of these models back to their source: the shared idea that constitutional justification is simply ordinary moral justification on a larger stage. Weinrib closes with some comments about what an alternative conception of justification might look like.
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