Kantian Legal Indeterminacy

This discussion frames a critical assessment of Kant’s thinking about legal indeterminacy, as outlined by Arthur Ripstein in his book Force and Freedom (2009), which gives a comprehensive recent overview and further development of Kant’s legal and political philosophy. Kevin Toh first examines whether Kant’s treatment of legal indeterminacy could be built upon to make progress in contemporary theorizing about the nature of law. He contends that contemporary legal philosophers have struggled to develop a satisfying treatment of legal indeterminacy and related issues, which are central to competing conceptions of the nature of law. Toh wishes to assess whether Kant offers any conceptual resources for a breakthrough – or at least for some progress. Second, he also aims to explore whether Kant’s approach to legal indeterminacy, at least as reported by Ripstein, is compelling in its own right. Guided by a sceptical view , Toh will conclude by sketching an alternative take on legal indeterminacy that he believes is more convincing. And he will also argue that there is a strand of Kantian thinking, displayed most clearly in Kant’s discussion of artistic genius in the Critique of Judgment (1790), that could be invoked to buttress the alternative approach that he is proposing.