(How) Can Psychological Research Inform Normative Theory?

This project investigates the conditions under which empirical research from psychology and related disciplines can inform normative argument. Drawing in part on detailed case studies from punishment theory, Rehren iden­ti­fies recurring inferential challenges in the interpretation of empirical data and examines the extent to which ex­ist­ing empirically-informed work in normative theory succeeds in addressing them.

Using empirical data in normative theory

In recent decades, normative theorists have increasingly drawn on empirical research from psychology and related disciplines. While this development is promising, it also raises important methodological challenges. Empirical findings do not automatically translate into philosophical conclusions. Rather, moving from quantitative data to qualitative normative claims requires a series of additional assumptions and inferences, the details of which often remain implicit and insufficiently defended.

Case study: the philosophy of punishment

The project combines general methodological analysis with concrete case studies. The philosophy of punishment provides a particularly fruitful area in which to examine how specifically empirical data is used in normative argument. Compared with other areas of normative theory, debates about punishment are often explicitly connected to social practice and institutional reform. As a result, they frequently rely on assumptions about what people think, feel, and do – assumptions that are often supported by empirical findings.

Why many empirically-informed normative arguments fail

On this basis, the project develops a broader account of recurring inferential challenges in empirically-informed normative theory. It focuses in particular on three issues: construct validity, generalizability, and minimum effect size. Rehren argues that these challenges threaten the plausibility of many empirically-informed normative arguments and examines how widespread the problem is likely to be in light of the kinds of questions philosophers ask and the current state of psychological research. In doing so, he also identifies avenues for improving the use of empirical evidence in normative theorizing.