Epistemic and Criminal Justice: The Economy of Witness Credibility in German Criminal Procedural Law

Struggles for recognition often concern not only the right to be heard but also to be believed. A recurrent criticism of criminal justice systems in Germany and elsewhere holds that the testimonies of some witness groups such as alleged victims of sexual offenses are not adequately believed. This criticism raises worries about the legitimacy of criminal procedures and should not be dismissed as mere empirical matters. One of the most influential theories in contemporary philosophy, Miranda Fricker's account of epistemic injustice, explores forms of injustice which persons may be exposed to in the production of knowledge and in giving testimony. The account provides a philosophical lens for analyzing German criminal procedural law. In particular, the talk examines the claim that epistemic justice may and should be considered an implicit principle of criminal procedural law, with implications for two case examples: the pre­sump­tion of falsity of witness statements, established in a landmark decision by the German Fed­eral Court of Justice over twenty years ago, as well as the way the justice system addresses specific group-based biases in judicial reasoning such as racial bias. Both suggest legal reforms.