Archive of Events 2021 – 2019

Archive of Events 2021 – 2019

A Conversation on Emancipatory Criminalization and Carceral Feminism [more]

Why Outcomes Matter (And How They Do)

Guest Lecture
  • Date: Nov 17, 2021
  • Time: 18:15
  • Speaker: Dr. Antje du Bois-Pedain
  • Antje du Bois-Pedain is Professor of Criminal Law and Philosophy at the Faculty of Law and Director of the Centre for Penal Theory and Penal Ethics at the Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge. She was trained as a lawyer in Germany, re­ceived her Dr. iur. from Humboldt University Berlin, and in the U.K. (Magister Juris, University of Oxford). She has been based at the University of Cambridge since 2001. One strand of her work addresses the philosophical founda­tions of state punishment and their significance for the application of law, and law reform. Here, recent collaborative work includes edited volumes on Criminal Law and the Authority of the State (2017), on Penal Censure: Engagements Within and Beyond Desert Theory (2019) and on Re-reading Beccaria: On the Contemporary Significance of a Penal Classic (forthcom­ing). Another major strand of her work is in criminal law theory and doctrine, often with a comparative or transnational di­mension. Here, she has recently written on participation in crime and on criminal-law causation, and is currently exploring outcome responsibility, as well as conceptions and functions of recklessness and negligence.
  • 2G rules/hybrid session: Please note that 2G rules will apply. In case we cannot ensure social distancing (1.5 m), you will also be required to wear a mask. You may choose to join via Zoom (details are provided below).
  • Location: Freiburg, Fürstenbergstr. 19
  • Room: Seminar room (F 113) | Guests are welcome!
  • Host: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Crime, Security and Law
  • Contact: c.hillemanns@csl.mpg.de
The problem of outcome responsibility, in criminal law, is the problem of providing a normative foundation for criminal-law practices that make outcomes relevant to criminal liability and sentencing – sometimes (as in the law of attempts) with relevant differences between intended and negligently-risked outcomes. My talk develops a conception of agency that can provide theoreti­cal underpinning for these practices. As a first step, I defend the widely accepted view that producing an outcome (either as an in­tended or as a negligently-unlucky one) makes a difference: so long as the outcome can be imputed to the agent, it qualifies what the agent is responsible for. The object of assessment (“what D has done”) changes from “X activity” (minus the outcome) to “X activity with outcome”. Potentially much more contentious is the second step in my argument: the claim that how the outcome matters for our responsibility is affected by the question whether the outcome is the product of our intentions or whether it is the product of risks we have negli­gently created. This analysis explains many contentious features of the criminal law. However, it puts pressure on the justification for outcome-dependent crimes of negligence as such. For how can, on the assumption that we have a much less tight connection to negligently-risked outcomes than to intended ones, the criminal law’s prac­tice of making the occurrence of the outcome the linchpin for most offences of criminal negligence, be defended? [more]

Lab Experiments – An Overlooked Tool in the Box of Criminology

Guest Lecture
Good fences make good neighbours. The “naturalistic fallacy” is a particularly solid fence. It not only claims that the normative disci­plines need not worry about facts. It would actually be a category error if they care. Although at its core the law is a normative disci­pline, it has not always been that hostile towards facts. But it used to have a rather loose attitude towards empirics. Often, any factual statement “that matters” has been accepted as a legitimate ele­ment of legal reasoning. A social scientist would likely disagree. A factual claim is not the same as empirical evidence, most im­portantly since correlation is not causation. Criminology defines itself as the social science concerned with crime and punishment. This invites a division of labour: to the extent that a normative conclusion in the area of criminal law rests on an empirical claim, it is for criminology to deliver the evidence. Yet what counts as evidence? To a relevant degree, this is not only a question of epistemology. It also is a matter of disciplinary culture. Historically, criminology defines itself as applied sociology. This historical root is a productive one. But it has led the discipline to largely ignore an im­portant source of evidence: experiments under the controlled conditions of the lab. Interestingly, in empirical legal studies, this method is much more established than in criminology, despite the fact that empirical legal studies are much more recent. The talk will explain why lab experiments could be helpful for criminology, and accordingly for the empirical grounding of criminal law, and will illustrate the power with experiments on crime and punishment. [more]

“Sexual Assault and Rape – What Can We Learn From and For Law Reform?”

Workshop supported by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation

Taking Criminal Responsibility (external event)

Oxford Seminars in Jurisprudence

Loss of Control – (un) acceptable emotions? (external event)

University of Oxford Criminal Law Discussion Group

Culpability, Consciousness, and Carrying on Regardless (external event)

University of Oxford Criminal Law Discussion Group

Evidentiary Standards, Human Fallibility, and Conviction Beyond Reasonable Doubt

Guest Lecture
In a lead­ing rul­ing on the stand­ard of proof, the Fed­er­al Court of Justice stated in 1970 that judges must be con­vinced to a “de­gree of cer­tainty” that need not quite be “bey­ond all reas­on­able doubt” but should go bey­ond a mere “prob­ab­il­ity bor­der­ing on cer­tain­ty.” The former is not re­quired by the law of evid­ence; the lat­ter is not suf­fi­cient (Rul­ing of the Fed­er­al Court of Justice in Civil Cases [BGHZ] 53, 245 ff.). From an epi­stem­o­lo­gic­al point of view, cla­ri­fic­a­tion is needed as to wheth­er a doxast­ic ap­proach fits in­to this nar­row con­struct. The BGH rul­ing refers to “con­vic­tion”, the “truth of an as­ser­tion”, and the re­quired “de­gree of cer­tainty”, but it does not ad­dress the con­cept of know­ledge, in which these ele­ments con­verge and are re­lated to each oth­er. In epi­stem­o­logy, it is dis­puted wheth­er or not hu­man fal­lib­il­ity, which is ir­re­voc­able, can be re­con­ciled with the as­sump­tion that hu­mans are cap­able of ac­quir­ing know­ledge. The lec­ture out­lines the ten­ets of a fal­lib­il­ist­ic concept of know­ledge and com­pares the chal­lenge of de­term­in­ing a suf­fi­cient level for the stand­ard of evid­ence to the epi­stem­o­lo­gic­al chal­lenge of re­con­cil­ing “to err is hu­man” with the claim to know­ledge. [more]
The event is organized by the Research Network on Law and the Cognitive Sciences (LACS). In this seminar, Prof. Gregg Caruso (SUNY Corning) presents his monograph, “Rejecting Retributivism: Free Will, Punishment, and Criminal Justice” (CUP, 2021). The event takes place September 16th, 2021 at 5pm CEST (11am EDT). [more]

Language and the Law in the Age of Migration

Conference
5th ILLA General Conference [more]
Soapbox Science is an annual public science communication event that brings cutting-edge science to the public, in an accessible, fun, free and un-intimidating way. [more]

Noncitizen Justice: The Criminal Case Processing of non-U.S. Citizens in Texas and California

Guest Lecture
Immigration enforcement is increasingly dependent on local criminal justice authorities, and yet basic questions on the criminal case processing of non-U.S. citizens in state and local jurisdictions remain unanswered. Leveraging uniquely rich case information on all felony arrests in California and Texas between 2006 and 2018, this article provides a detailed examination of the legal treatment of non-U.S. citizens from booking through sentencing. In both states, we find that non-U.S. citizens arrested for the same crime and with the same prior record are significantly more likely to be convicted and incarcerated than U.S. citizens. These unexplained citizenship gaps often exceed the observed disparities between white and minority defendants, but the results were not identical in both states. In line with the more rigid views towards migrant criminality in Texas, the case processing of foreign nationals is notably more severe there than in California at nearly every key decision point. These findings suggest that even in local criminal justice settings, citizenship is a unique and consequential axis of contemporary legal inequality. [more]
The two-hour on­li­ne event will con­sist of a wel­co­me mes­sa­ge by Pro­fes­sor Ro­bert Spa­no (Pre­si­dent of the Eu­ro­pean Court of Hu­man Rights), in­tro­duc­to­ry re­marks by Pro­fes­sors An­drew As­hworth (Uni­ver­si­ty of Ox­ford), R A Duff (Uni­ver­si­ty of Stir­ling) and Lu­cia Zed­ner (Uni­ver­si­ty of Ox­ford), a brief pre­sen­ta­ti­on of the vo­lu­me’s con­tent by its edi­tors, a pa­nel dis­cus­si­on with the con­tri­bu­ting au­t­hors and a Q&A ses­si­on with the au­dience. The pa­nel dis­cus­si­on will be led by three aca­de­mic com­men­ta­tors, Pro­fes­sors Tat­ja­na Hörn­le (MPI-CSL, Frei­burg), Dou­glas Hu­sak (Rut­gers Uni­ver­si­ty) and Val­sa­mis Mit­si­legas (Queen Ma­ry Uni­ver­si­ty of Lon­don), who will com­ment on co­re aspects of the book and its chap­ters and pro­vi­de au­t­hors right of re­p­ly. Points of dis­cus­si­on will be ba­sed on the vo­lu­me’s in­di­vi­du­al con­tri­bu­ti­ons as such and al­so eva­lua­ted in the light of the spe­ci­al to­pic ‘Pro­por­tio­na­li­ty and Cri­mi­nal law in a State of Emer­gen­cy’. The aim is to high­light the re­le­van­ce of the book’s cen­tral to­pic to cur­rent emer­gen­cy is­su­es causing go­ver­n­ments and in­ter­na­tio­nal or­ga­ni­sa­ti­ons to ad­opt high­ly in­tru­si­ve re­stric­ti­ve mea­su­res and new (oc­ca­sio­nal­ly ex­tre­me) se­cu­ri­ty and sur­veil­lan­ce re­gi­mes. [more]
Grea­ter so­cioe­co­no­mic in­e­qua­li­ty is as­so­cia­ted with hig­her cri­me ra­tes. If this as­so­cia­ti­on is cau­sal, it is un­cle­ar how the po­pu­la­tion-le­vel va­ria­ble, in­e­qua­li­ty, af­fects de­ci­si­ons to of­fend in in­di­vi­du­als’ heads. I will pre­sent a re­cent theo­re­ti­cal mo­del in which in­di­vi­du­als strive to re­main their re­sources abo­ve a thres­hold of de­spe­ra­ti­on that is set by their so­ci­al con­text. Grea­ter in­e­qua­li­ty means mo­re in­di­vi­du­als who are at or be­low this thres­hold. It be­co­mes ra­tio­nal for them to of­fend as a ris­ky stra­t­egy to leap cle­ar of it. This pro­du­ces a link bet­ween po­pu­la­ti­on-le­vel in­e­qua­li­ty and in­di­vi­du­al de­ci­si­on-ma­king. Mo­reo­ver, we show that in­cre­a­sing pu­nis­h­ment se­ve­ri­ty un­der the­se as­s­ump­ti­ons should not ge­ne­ral­ly ex­pec­ted to re­du­ce of­fen­ding. I pre­sent a fra­me­work for stu­dy­ing the as­s­ump­ti­ons and pre­dic­ti­ons of the mo­del in a mul­ti-player in­cen­ti­vi­zed eco­no­mic ga­me. Pre­li­mi­na­ry da­ta are con­sis­tent with the pre­dic­ti­ons of the mo­del. Ho­we­ver, they are al­so con­sis­tent with simp­ler but still re­le­vant hy­po­the­ses that do not use the as­s­ump­ti­on of a de­spe­ra­ti­on thres­hold, such as that loss com­pa­red to so­me men­tal re­fe­rence point leads to frus­tra­ti­on and an­ger. We are current­ly at­t­emp­ting to test bet­ween the­se al­ter­na­ti­ves. We ho­pe that the ex­pe­ri­men­tal fra­me­work, re­gard­less of which way the re­sults fall out, is use­ful for un­der­stan­ding an­ti­so­ci­al mo­ti­va­ti­ons. [more]
– Roots of Responsibility ERC Project – [more]

Sociological Approaches to Legal Theory

Guest Lecture
This talk approaches core issues in contemporary legal philosophy from a sociologically informed standpoint. It begins by positioning sociological approaches in relation to legal philosophy, and then discusses, in turn, sociological jurisprudence (including holism and historicism), law as an artifact, and the social construction of law. Critical comments are welcome on this draft essay. [more]

Collaborative Dishonesty – A Meta-Study

Guest Lecture
Dishonesty is often a result of collaborative efforts. We present the first meta-study on collaborative dishonesty, reviewing 51,640 decisions, made by 3,264 individuals. Results reveal that: people lie more (i) in collaborative than in individual settings, (ii) when their partners lie, and (iii) in later stages of the interaction. [more]

“Sex Must be Voluntary”: Sexual Communication and the New Definition of Rape in Sweden

Guest Lecture
  • Date: Mar 31, 2021
  • Time: 18:00 - 20:00
  • Speaker: Dr. Linnea Wegerstad (Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Lund University / Sweden)
  • Lin­nea We­ger­stad has a De­gree of Doc­tor of Laws from Lund Uni­ver­si­ty. Her doc­to­ral the­sis ex­plo­res the con­cept of se­xu­al in­te­gri­ty through a his­to­ri­cal, theo­re­ti­cal, and doc­tri­nal ana­ly­sis of Swe­dish cri­mi­nal law. She has prac­ti­ced as a jud­ge in the ge­ne­ral courts for a few years and is now a se­ni­or lec­tur­er of cri­mi­nal law at Lund Uni­ver­si­ty. Her main field of re­se­arch is se­xu­al of­fen­ses and fe­mi­nist le­gal theo­ry. She is current­ly in­vol­ved in a re­se­arch pro­ject tit­led “The #Me­too Mo­men­tum and Its Af­ter­math: Cri­me Vic­tims’ Ju­sti­ce-See­king and So­cie­tal and Le­gal Re­spon­ses”, fun­ded by the Swe­dish Cri­me Vic­tim Com­pen­sa­ti­on and Sup­port Au­t­ho­ri­ty.
  • Location: via Zoom
  • Host: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Crime, Security and Law
  • Contact: c.hillemanns@csl.mpg.de
Ma­ny coun­tries are in a pro­cess of re­pla­cing out­da­ted sex of­fen­se re­gu­la­ti­ons with laws that ac­cu­ra­te­ly cor­re­spond to mo­dern ideas about gen­der equa­li­ty, se­xu­al self-de­ter­mi­na­ti­on, and con­sen­su­al sex. One ex­am­ple is Swe­den, whe­re a law that de­fi­nes ra­pe ba­sed on a cri­te­ri­on of non­vo­lun­ta­ry par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on en­te­red in­to for­ce in 2018. This lec­ture pres­ents an ana­ly­sis of how ra­pe is un­der­stood in the new le­gal dis­cour­se in Swe­den, and I show that ra­pe is pre­sen­ted as a mat­ter of choi­ce and com­mu­ni­ca­ti­on in se­xu­al si­tua­ti­ons. I argue that the new ra­pe law sends a cle­ar mes­sa­ge about what sex should be — na­me­ly, vo­lun­ta­ry — but does not ac­cu­ra­te­ly de­s­cri­be the cri­me and the be­ha­vi­or that de­ser­ves cri­mi­nal cen­su­re. I con­clu­de that a les­son from Swe­den is that fu­ture ra­pe law re­forms may be­ne­fit from em­pi­ri­cal know­led­ge of how peo­ple com­mu­ni­ca­te in se­xu­al si­tua­ti­ons. [more]
Roundtable presentations & discussion [more]
BIOETHICS FORUM [more]
The de­ba­te over dif­fe­rences in U.S. and Eu­ro­pean speech rights is a per­en­ni­al is­sue. But, the emer­gence of pri­va­te so­ci­al me­dia platforms – and their do­mi­nance – has gi­ven the is­sue a new dimension and a new sen­se of ur­gen­cy. What is the ro­le and responsibility of the state and pri­va­te com­pa­nies in terms of monitoring and pre­ven­ting ha­te speech? Whe­re is the di­vi­ding line between free speech and cen­sor­ship? [more]

Zugang zu Recht (external event)

Conference

Racism and Police Violence in the United States and Germany

Panel Discussion
Online discussion via Zoom with Dr. Nicole Hirschfelder, University of Tübingen, and Esther Earbin, J.D., Max Planck Institute for the Study of Crime, Security and Law, Freiburg. [more]
International spring course – 12th edition "Criminal Law, Religion and Security" [more]
Lecture Series Frei­bur­ger Vor­trä­ge zur Staats­wis­sen­schaft und Rechts­phi­lo­so­phie | Co­ope­ra­ti­on: Uni­ver­si­ty of Frei­burg & Max Planck In­sti­tute for Foreign and International Criminal Law. [more]
According to the standard view of rights, rights are not absolute. Sometimes, to save some, it is permissible to do things that would normally violate rights but that, under the circumstances, merely infringe them. The function of rights, on this standard view, is at most to raise a kind of moral barrier to their neglect. Moreover, even if an agent has sufficient moral reason to get over that barrier, she will presumably have wronged the right-holder. The only way, according to the standard theory, to do what would normally wrong a right holder, without actually wronging the person, is if she has waived or forfeited her right. I will argue that much of this standard picture is wrong. I argue for a different model—the mechanics of claims—according to which rights are the output of a balance of claims, an output which describes what is ultimately permissible. Rights infringement is, on this view, a misleading, morally distorting idea. Rather, we need to focus on how different kinds of claims interact, and what makes claims stronger or weaker. Forfeiture is only part of that picture, a part that is over-emphasized in the standard view. As for the state, I will argue that through its law-making and regulatory power, it has an important role in fixing certain kinds of substantive rights. It sets, within limits, what count as legitimate expectations. Nonetheless, the state’s power is substantially limited by substantive rights. Although the state has certain unique powers, it remains an agent confronting other agents in a space of rights. It is within this framework that I argue we should think carefully about when defensive force may permissibly be used. [more]

Effectiveness and Proportionality – Modern Challenges in Security Law and Criminal Justice

Workshop
Spea­kers and dis­cus­si­on mo­de­ra­tors: Prof. em. Ant­ony Duff (keyno­te), Prof. Hans-Jörg Al­brecht, Prof. Ili­as Ana­gno­sto­pou­los, Prof. Lo­re­na Bach­mai­er, Dr. Em­ma­nouil Bil­lis, Prof. em. Mi­cha­el Bo­the, Prof. Johan Boucht, Prof. em. Ne­stor Coura­kis, Prof. Mar­kus Dubber (tbc), Prof. Tho­mas El­holm, Ema­nue­la-Chia­ra Gil­lard, LL.M., Prof. Tat­ja­na Hörn­le, Prof. John Jack­son, Dr. Kon­stan­ze Jar­vers (tbc), Dr. Nan­dor Knust, Prof. Claes Ler­nes­tedt, Prof. Rus­sell Mil­ler, Prof. Val­sa­mis Mit­si­legas (tbc), Prof. Chri­stos My­lo­no­pou­los, Dr. Va­gia Po­ly­zoi­dou, Prof. Ralf Po­scher, Prof. Ju­li­an Roberts, Prof. Jon Pet­ter Rui, Prof. Ul­rich Sie­ber, EC­tHR-Jud­ge Robert Spa­no, Prof. Ri­chard Vog­ler, Prof. em. Tho­mas Wei­gend, and Prof. Lu­cia Zed­ner. [more]
The workshop will provide a forum for bilateral dialogue between German and Chinese legal scholars, dealing with some most interesting topics in the field of cybercrime. [more]
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