Relational Normativity

In recent years, theories that describe themselves as ‘relational’ have gained importance in both moral and legal philosophy. They all share the basic conviction that norms, obligations, claims and powers arise from our rela­tion­ships rather than from abstract values alone. According to this view, the nature of the relationships between individuals or groups is fundamental to legal and ethical standards. This is because these normative standards are not based exclusively on characteristics of individual capacity to act, but are also shaped by the roles, expec­ta­tions and responsibilities that arise from the relationships between the actors. But what does it actually mean for normativity to be relational? Looking at the moral and legal philological debates of recent decades, numerous approaches from completely different perspectives compete for the title of pursuing a relational approach. The ‘Relational Normativity’ project has set itself the goal of taking stock of this debate. It reflects on the latest developments in the debates on relational normativity and points to new avenues for future research in this area. Based on a broad understanding of relational normativity, it explores the question of what it means for certain norms, expectations and ethical standards to emerge from and be defined by the nature of relationships between individuals or groups.