Defamation Offenses in Democratic Societies

“Among a democratic nation (...) it is impossible ever to agree beforehand on what shall or shall not be allowed by the laws of honour”. Alexis de Tocqueville stated this thesis in his work “De la démocratie en Amérique”* and based it on the leveling of social classes and the volatility of public opinion in a democratic state. Although this diagnosis is consistent with some historical and sociological studies, which assume a decline of honor in modern times, it is at odds with the continuing relevance of honor in various legal contexts, such as with regard to the criminal law protection against insults and defamation. Time and again, defamation offenses – and with them the concept of honor, which some consider dead – return to the public eye, for example, in the case of the insults directed at German politician Renate Künast. However, criminal law protection against defamation is anything but a given in a fragmented democratic society due to the diversity and controversial nature of concepts of honor. The project therefore addresses the question of whether and how criminal law protection against insults can be pursued in liberal democratic states.

^{* cited from: de Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America (1840), Vol. II, translated by Henry Reeve, J. & H. G. Langley, 1984, 544-545.}